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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE "NEW AM) 
IMPROVED" INTENT TEST: OLD WINE IN NEW 
BOTTLES 
Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin* 
I. INTRODUCTION I 
Since the Supreme Court injected the issue of intent into the voting 
rights arena in Mobile v. Bolden,' there has been a long and persistent 
struggle to reverse that decision. In 1982, Congress thought it had put 
the question of the quantum and quality of proof required to establish 
a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act2 to rest when 
Congress amended that section? However, the courts quickly began 
* Professor of Law, Pace University; Director, Social Justice Center, Pace Law 
School. B.A., Columbia University (1975); J.D., Harvard University (1978). 
I wish to thank my research assistant, Linda M. Lin, for her assistance during the 
research phase of this article. I also wish to thank the staff of the Social Justice 
Center (Debra Cohen, staff attorney; Susan Scaria, Debra Jones, and Paulette 
Bainbridge, interns) for their assistanceduring the editing phase of this project. 
446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
Section2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, provides: 
(a) No voting qualificationor prerequisiteto voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973 b(f)(2), as provided 
in subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participationby members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in 
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice. The extent to which members of a protectedclass have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstancewhich may 
be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population. 
42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (1982). 
See, ag., James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discriminntion: 
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69 
Va L. Rev. 633 (1983); Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman, AmededSection 
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a rear guard action to undermine congressional efforts to eliminate 
the intent requirement as an element of a plaintiffs claim. Both the 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts have played various roles in the 
effort to re-assert the intent test in, albeit, a "new and improved" 
form.4 Despite Congress' best efforts, the intent test is back. The role 
of scholars and practitioners is to understand the new test and 
determine how to satisfy this most stringent requirement. In this 
article, the contours of the new test will be examined and the 
question of what proof is required to satisfy the test will be explored. 
Part I1 will discuss the Mobile decision and congressional efforts to 
eliminate the intent test from section 2. Part I11 will explore the 
several opinions in Thornburg where the question of the intent of 
Congress when it amended section 2 was discussed. Finally, in Part 
IV, the circuit court decisions, essentially adopting Justice 
07Connor7s opinion, will be analyzed to determine the contours of 
the new intent test and the elements of proof required to meet it. 
This article concludes that the courts "got it wrong" when they re- 
introduced the intent standard, and that Congress intended to banish 
- 
intent as a requirement of a plaintiffs case. However, recognizing 
that practitioners must live with what is, and not what ought to be, 
2 of the Voting Rights Act: What is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 Emory L.J. 1 
(1987); Frank R Parker, f i e  'Results' Test of Section 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act: 
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 Va. L. Rev. 715 (1983); Randolph M. Scott- 
McLaughlin, Chisom v. Roemer: Where Do We Go From Here?, 24 Colum. Hum. 
Rts. L. Rev 1 (1993). 
In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), a debate raged between Justices 
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, and O'Connor, 
joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, over whether there 
was any vestige of the intent standard in the amended section 2. Justice Brennan 
believed that Congress meant to banish intent evidence from the vote dilution 
inquiry, whereas Justice O'Connor opined that intent proof should not be excluded 
from a section 2 challenge to an at-large election system. The Gingles decision is 
discussed infra in Part Three. The circuit courts that have considered this issue have 
all agreed with Justice O'Connor7s view that intent proof was relevant to the 
inquiry under the totality of circumstances standard. See, e.g., Goosby v. Town 
Board of the Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, (2nd. Cir. 1999)(intent proof 
relevant to overall vote dilution inquiry); accord Lewis v. Almance County, 99 F. 
3d 600 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, 
1 16 F.3d 1 194 (7th Cir. 1997); Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 
973 (1st. Cir. 1995); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (1 lth Cir. 1994); Sanchez v. 
Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303 (1996); cf: League of United Latin Citizens v. Clements, 
999 F. 2d 83 1 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
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the article theorizes that the new test is not as disCicult to prove as the 
old intent test. 
][I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTENT STAWDAFW: 
FROM MOBLW TO CONGRESS. 
A, THE MOBILE DECISION 
In Mobile v. Bolden: the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
the type of proof required to establish a violation of both section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act6 and the Fifteenth Amendment7 to the United 
States Constitutioa8 The opinion focused primarily on the 
parameters of the Fifteenth Amendment's protections, but also 
discussed the standard of proof for the section 2 claim as well. 
Essentially, the Court expressed its belief that both the statutory and 
constitutional claim should be governed by the same standard? 
The Court concluded that the language of section 2 merely 
elaborated on that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that the statutory 
provision was intended to have the same effect as the Amendment 
446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
At the time of the Mobile decision, section2 providd. 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, pncticc, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State of political subdivision 
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color. 
42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (1965). 
' Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[tlhe right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 
Mobile, 446 U.S. 55. Afiican-American citizens of that city brought a class 
action challengingthe constitutionalityof the at-large method of electing Mobile's 
City Commission as a violation of both section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment 
446 U.S. at 58. The District Court, without ruling on the statutory claim, concluded 
that the constitutionalrights of the plaintiffs and the class they represented had been 
violated and ordered the creation of a single-member district plan. Id. The F i  
Circuit upheld the district court's opinion. Id 
Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60. The Court was critical of the failure of the lower courts 
to address the statutory claim as they were required to by gened principles of 
judicial administration. Id, citing Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Mchughlin, 323 
US. 101,105 (1944). Neverlheless,the Court concluded that statutory claim added 
nothing to the plaintiffs' complaint. Id 
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itself." While noting that the legislative history of section 2 was 
sparse, the Court observed that the view that this section merely 
restated the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment was expressed 
without contradiction during the hearings on the Voting Rights Act 
that held in the Senate. After its review of the legislative history of 
section 2, the Court determined that that section of the Voting Rights 
Act and the Fifteenth Amendment were cotermin~us.~~ 
The Court turned its attention to a delineation of the scope of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the standard of proof required to establish 
a violation of the amendment.12 As a threshold matter, the Court 
noted that it was clear that action by a state that is racially neutral 
violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.13 The Court also found support for this 
theory of the Fifteenth Amendment in cases involving the 
establishment of political boun~laries~~ and in the reapportionment 
context15 From its review of cases decided under the Fifteenth 
lo Mobile, 446 U.S. at 6 1. 
'' Id. 
l2 Id. at 61-62. 
'3 Id. (citing Guinn v. US., 238 U.S. 347 (1915)). Guinn involved a challenge to 
a "grandfather" clause that exempted fiom Oklahoma's literacy requirement 
persons who were entitled to vote before January 1, 1866, or the descendants of 
such persons. The Guinn Court concluded that the grandfather clause was 
unconstitutional because it was not "possible to discover any basis in reason for the 
standard. . . other than the purpose" of circumventing the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Id at 365. 
I4 See Gomillionv. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Gomillion was a challenge to 
a 1957 Alabama statute that redefmed the city boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama 
The effect of the statute was to transmute Tuskegee's borders from a square into an 
irregular shaped polygon, which removed fiom the city almost all of the Afiican- 
American voters, and not one white voter. Id. at 341. The Gomillion Court held 
that allegations of a racially motivated gerrymander of a city's boundaries stated a 
valid claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. According to the Court in Mobile, 
the decision in Gontillion stands for the proposition that in the absence of an 
invidious, racially discriminatorymotive, a state was constitutionally fiee to redraw 
political boundaries without federal court intervention. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 63. 
l5 See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). In Wright, the plaintiffs 
challenged certain congressional district lines drawn by the New York State 
Legislature following the 1960 census. The complaint charged that minority 
residents had been overly concentrated@acked) into certain districts. The Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove that the legislature was motivated by racial considerations when it 
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Amendment, the Court held that racially discriminatory motivation 
was a necessary ingredient of a claim alleging violation of the 
Amendment.16 
With respect to the constitutionality of multimember districts, the 
Court stated that it had never held such districts unconstitutional per 
se." The Court acknowledged that such legislative reapportionment 
could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose was "to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic 
mino~ities."'~ In order to establish such a claim, the plaintiff "must 
prove that the disputed plan was conceived or operated as [a] 
Cpurposeful] device to further racial . . . ~liscrimination."~~ According 
to the Court, this burden of proof allocation was required under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause which prohibits 
only purposeli discriminati~n.~ 
Despite its conclusion that discriminatory purpose was a 
prerequisite to a claim of a Fifteenth or Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, the Court conceded that proof of a-statute's impact may be 
relevant to a constitutional ~hallenge.~' Nevertheless, the Court 
concludedthat in a challenge to an entire system of local governance, 
"where the character of the law is readily explainable on grounds" 
other than race, disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to 
establish a constitutional claim." According to the Court in Mobile, 
courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of 
discriminatory purpose.= While the Court was clear that intent proof 
was required to establish a Fifteenth Amendment claim, it failed to 
drew the challenged congressional l i e s  or that the districts had, in fact, had been 
dI-a\~ along racial l ies .  Id. at 56. 
l6 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62. 
l7 See, e-g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755 (1973). 
l8 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66. 
l9 Id. 
20 Id. at 66-67. 
2' See Ar l i i on  Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 
(1977) (finding that the impact of the official action - whether it km more 
heavily on one race than another - may provide an important starting point in 
determiniigracially discriminatory purpose). 
" Mobile 446 U.S. at 70. 
= 1d. 
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state what type of proof would suffice to meet the high burden of 
proof it required. 
Justice White in his dissent believed that the Court's decision was 
a radical departure from its Fifteenth Amendment ju~~prudence .~~ 
He noted that in White v. Rege~ter,~' the Court had unanimously held 
that the use of multi-member districts in two counties in Texas 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because, based on a totality of the circumstances, the districts 
excluded minority voters from effective political parti~ipation.~~ In 
Justice White's opinion, the decision in Mobile was flatly 
inconsistent with White.27 He stated that, contrary to the Court's 
opinion in Mobile, invidious discriminatory purpose could be 
inferred from proof, under the totality of the circumstances, of 
objective factors of the kind relied on in White.28 
Mobile was a retreat fiom the Court's earlier decisions in White 
and Whitcomb. In both cases, the Court did not require specific proof 
of intent. Rather, the Court adopted an approach that required 
examination of a myriad of objective factors to establish proof of a 
constitutional In Mobile, the Court tried to harmonize the 
24 Id. at 94. 
" 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
26 Id. at 95. 
"Id. at 101. 
Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67. In affming the district court's opinion, the 
Court in White relied on proof of a history of racial discrimination in Texas, which 
touched on the right of African-Americans to register and vote and to participate in 
the democratic process, the use of a majority vote requirement, the use of a "place" 
rule limiting candidacy for a legislative ofice fiom a multimember district to a 
specified place on the ballof the lack of minority success at the polls, exclusion of 
minorities fiom the slating process employed by a white dominated organization 
that effectively controlled the nomination of Democratic candidates, and the use of 
racial appeals. Id. 
29 The Fifth Circuit in Zimrner v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 
1973), affdper curium sub nom East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 
U.S. 636 (1976), developed a specific set of factors, gleaned from the Whitcomb 
and White decisions: 
[Wlhere a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of 
slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized 
interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member 
or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general 
precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is 
made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large 
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Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence with the case law under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, wherein intent 
proof wvas required.30 However, the Court gave little guidance to 
lower courts as to how to apply this new test in the context of a 
statutory challenge to a multi-member district. The Court did not 
state that a plaintiff had to prove that individd legislators were 
racists-Nor did the Court discuss how a plaintiffcould prove that the 
legislature itself \vas motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Nor did 
the Court discuss what role, if any, proof of racism in the electorate 
should play in the determination of a constitutional or statutory 
violation. In effect, by equating proof under section 2 with the 
stringent requirements of the equal protection clause, the Court 
unsettled voting rights law. In an effort to recti& this defeat, the civil 
rights community turned to Congress to correct the Court's 
misinterpretationof section 2. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE 
RESULTS TEST 
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act, in part, as a 
response to the Mobile decision. The Senate Report, prepared by the 
Committee on the Judiciary, delineated the purpose of the amended 
section 2. A review of the Report clearly indicates that Conpss 
intended to reject the intent standard and restore voting rights law to 
the pre-Mobile decisions?' 
The Senate Report set forth the purpose of the amendment to 
section 2. The report stated that the amendment was designed to 
make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to 
establish a violation of section 2. The purpose of the amendment 
was to restore the legal standards that applied to vote dilution claims 
- p~ - 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and 
the lack of provision for at- large candidates running for particular 
geographical sub-districts. The fact of dilution is established upon proof of 
the existence of an aggregate of these factors. 
Id. 
30 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66-67. 
31 S. Rep. No. 417,97th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 
[hereinafters. Rep.]. The Supreme Court in Thornburgv. Gingfes, 478 U.S. 30.43 
n.7 (1986), stated that the Senate Report was the authoritativeguide to the meaning 
of the amended section 2. 
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prior to the Mobile decision. The amendment also included a new 
subsection to section 2 that delineated the legal standards under the 
results te~t.3~ According to the report, the issue to be decided under 
the results test is whether the political processes rue equally open to 
minority voters. 
The discussion concerning the amendment to section 2 provides 
insight into the scope of the changes made in 1982 to the statute. 
The report stated that proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a 
prerequisite to establishing a violation of section 2. The 'amendment 
permitted voting rights plaintiffs to prove a violation by showing that 
minority voters were denied an equal chance to participate in the 
political process?' 
In rejecting the intent standard, the Judiciary Committee 
("Committee") made several key findings. The Committee 
concluded that requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose was 
inconsistent with the original legislative intent and subsequent 
legislative history of section 2. Second, the Mobile decision was a 
radical departure from both Supreme C o w  and lower federal court 
precedent in the voting rights field, Third, the intent test focuses on 
the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon voting 
rights plaintiffs. Fourth, the amendment was not an effort to overturn 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, rather it was 
designed to correct the misreading of section 2 by the Court." 
The Committee believed that the rejection of the intent test was 
consistent with the original legislative understanding of section 2 
when the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The proponents of 
the intent test contended that section 2 was designed to track the 
Fifteenth Amendment and that the amendment required proof of a 
discriminatory purpose. Since Congress chose to track the language 
of the Fifteenth Amendment in the 1965 version of section 2, an 
intent requirement was also present in the statute. 
After examining the legislative history of the 1965 statute, the 
relevant legislative history of the 1970 extension of the Act, and the 
general understanding in 1965 of what was required to establish a 
Fifteenth Amendment violation, the Committee rejected the 
" S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 2. 
" S. Rep., supra n.20, at 13. 
34 S. Rep., supra n.20, at 13. 
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arguments of the advocates of the intent standard. The Committee 
noted that throughout the hearings and debates on the original 
version of section 2, there was no statement by a proponent or 
opponent of statute indicating that section 2 only reached purposell 
discrimination. Moreover, the legislative history of the 1970 
extension of the Voting Rights Act codinned that Congress had not 
intended to limit the original section 2 to situations where 
discriminatory intent was p r o ~ e d . ~  
With respect to the constitutional context, the Committee observed 
that Congress had to make a choice as to whether section 2 should be 
coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment or whether the statute 
should be broader. In 1965 there was no need to choose between 
these two alternatives. It was possible to regard section 2 as a 
restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment, and as reaching vote 
dilution regardless of whether intent was established. According to 
the Committee, there was no general understanding in 1965, among 
academics, practitioners and the lower federal courts that the 
Fifteenth or Fourteenth Amendments always required proof of 
discriminatoryintent to establish a violatioe From its review of the 
case law, at the time of the enactment of section 2, the Committee 
concluded that proof of intent was not always a prerequisite to a 
liability finding. In some cases the Supreme Court focused its 
analysis on discriminatory purposes or resultsn In other cases, the 
Court suggestedthat liability could be establishedunder either test* 
To ensure that the courts understood the intent of Congress when it 
amended section 2, the Committee set out in great detail its 
understanding of the operation of section 2 and the standards that 
were to govern litigation under it. The Committee stated that "[tlhe 
amendment of section 2 is designed to make clear that plainti& need 
not prove a discriminatorypurpose in the adoption or maintenance of 
35 S. Rep., supra n.20, at 14. 
S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 15. The Committee noted that in 1965. 
" Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court had held that 
a claim of unconstitutionalvote dilution could be establiihedby a showing of either 
discriminatory results or discriminatory purpose. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 
(1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 219, 225 (1971) (finding that proof of discriminatory intent was not 
determinativeof whether there was a violation of the equal protection ckuse). 
38 S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 15. 
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the challenged system or practice in order to establish a viola t i~n. '~~ 
A vote dilution plaintiff could choose to either prove an intentional 
violation or demonstrate that the challenged system or practice, 
under the totality of circumstances, resulted in the denial of equal 
access to the political process. If a plaintiff chose to proceed under 
the results standard, the court would be required to assess the impact 
of the challenged system on the basis of objective factors, without 
making any inquiry about the motivations that lay behind the 
adoption or maintenance of the practice. The Committee clearly 
stated that the "specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs 
may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any 
kind of discriminatory purpo~e."~ 
39 Id. at21. 
S. Rep., supra at 22 (emphasis supplied). in order to give guidance to the lower 
courts, the Committee set out several objective factors that were relevant to a vote 
dilution claim under section 2: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority goup to 
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually 
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot 
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the 
opportunity for discriminationagainst the minority group; 
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the minority 
group have been denied access to that process; 
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or 
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as 
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process; 
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle 
racial appeals; 
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to 
public office in the jurisdiction. 
S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 22. These enumerated factors bear close resemblance to the 
criteria developed by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer. See note 19, supra. Other factors 
that were deemed relevant to the inquiry where whether there had been a significant 
lack of responsiveness to the particularized needs of the minority community and 
whether the policy underlying the challenged practice was tenuous. The 
Committee cautioned that there was no requirement that any particular number of 
factors be proved or that a majority of them point one way or another. Id. at 22. 
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In its Report, the Committee also addressed the rationale behind 
the rejection of the intent test. The Committee believed that the test 
asked the wrong question. Under the intent test, the focus of the 
inquiry was not on how the challenged practice impacted the ability 
of minority voters to participate in the political process; rather, the 
focus was solely on the motivations of officials, who may have 
established the practice in the distant past. Under the intent test, so 
long as the motive for creating a multimember district was not 
racially discriminatory, the system could not be changed under 
section 2, regardless of its impact on minority voters in the present. 
The Committee believed that if minority voters are denied a fair 
opportunity to participate, the system should be changed, without 
requiring proof of why the system w a s  created or maintained:' 
An additional rationale for the rejection of the intent test by the 
Committee was that it was divisive. In order to satisfy the test, 
plaintiffs had to brand entire communities or officials as racists. 
Litigants were required to explore the motivations of individual 
elected officials and other citizens to determine whether their 
decisions were motivated by invidious racial considerations. 
According to the Committee should inquiries threatened to destroy 
any existing racial progress in a community." 
Another reason for eliminating proof of intent fiom the plaintiffs 
case was the difficulty in establishing racial motivation. In the cases 
where the challenged practice was adopted in the pat ,  there may be 
no evidence regarding intent since legislators may have died and the 
legislative records regarding the adoption of the challenged system 
may no longer be in existence. In fact, most smaller cities and 
counties would not have maintained the kind of official records 
needed to establish the motivation of the legislature."' In cases 
involving recent enactments, the courts may rule that legislative 
immunity barred plaintiffs fiom inquiring into the motives of 
individual legislators. Moreover, the Committee noted the difficulty 
in proving the motives of the majority of the electorate when an 
41 S. Rep., q r a  at 28. 
42 S. Rep., supran. 20, at 28. 
43 Id 
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election law was adopted or maintained as the result of a 
referendum." 
The Committee was also concerned that reliance on the intent test 
afforded an opportunity for defendants to "muddy the waters." The 
Committee feared that defendants would offer non-racial 
rationalizationsfor a law, which in fact purposely discriminates. This 
defect could not be eliminated even in cases where plaintiffs could 
establish intent by reliance on a wide variety of circumstantial and 
indirect evidence, because the defendants could attempt to rebut this 
proof by planting a false trail of direct evidence eschewing racial 
motive, and advancing other governmental objectives. The 
Committee concluded that "[slo long as the court must make a 
separate ultimate finding of intent, after accepting the proof of the 
factors involved in the White analysis, that danger remains and 
seriously clouds the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances 
of racial discrimination in American  election^."^^ 
It should be clear fiom this review of the Senate Report that 
Congress intended to reject the intent test as a necessary element of a 
vote dilution claim under section 2. The goal of the amendment was 
to restore the law to the pre-Mobile doctrine of White and its 
progeny. Under these cases, a plaintiff had to establish, using 
objective factors, that the political process or challenged system 
resulted in denying minority voters an equal opportunity to 
participate in the process and elect their candidates of choice. In 
essence, under the totality of circumstances test, employed pre- 
Mobile, a plaintiff had to paint a picture of the political realities in a 
jurisdiction and demonstrate that minorities had less access to the 
process than white voters. This was not an easy test and required a 
wide and far-reaching inquiry into the political life of a polity and the 
impact of the challenged system on minority voters. 
Throughout the Report there are repeated references to why that 
test was inadequate in the vote rights field. One of the main reasons 
was that it was almost impossible, in many instances, to frnd 
motivation evidence in cases that involved electoral practices that 
were of ancient vintage. Another concern was that in cases of recent 
vintage, clever defendants could offer pretextual non-racial 
" Id 
45 Id. at 29. 
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explanations for the adoption or maintenance of an electoral system 
and blunt a plaintifps efforts to establish intent through 
circumstantial proof. Congress was concerned that to permit 
defendants to rebut a plaintiffs evidence by offering 
nondiscriminatory rationales could limit the ability of section 2 to 
. eradicate racial discriminaton. 
Moreover, at no point in the Report does the Committee suggest 
that the amendment was designed to address solely the factual 
context of the Mobile case. Mobile was a challenge to the adoption 
and maintenance by elected officials of an at-large election system. 
However, the Committee did not limit the rejection of the intent test 
to cases involving only legislative enactments; thereby allowing 
other types of intent proof to remain a part of a plaintiffs burden In 
fact, there were numerous references in the Report that intent proof 
of any kind was to be banished fiom the analysis. 
Accordingly, under the new section 2, plaintiffs did not have to 
offer any intent evidence to establish a voting rights claim. The 
plaintiff could offer such proof or proceed completely under the 
results test. Under a fair reading of the Report, if a plaintiff chose to 
proceed under the objective test, a defendant could not rebut that 
proof by showing the absence of racially discriminatory intent in the 
adoption, maintenance or operation of the challenged system. This 
conclusion flows fiom the cautionary note sounded by the 
Committee in its discussion of how defendants, under the old intent 
test, could offer nonracial explanations to defeat a circumstantial 
dilution claim, where a court made an inferential finding of intent 
itom the indirect evidence. If the Committee were critical of the use 
of nonracial rationales under the old intent standard, it would follow 
that such proof should have no role in the results test. 
In Gingles, the Court, in several opinions, grappled with the 
method of proving a vote dilution challenge to an at-large election 
system and whether intent \vas still an element of proof in voting 
rights case?' The majority of the Court agreed with Justice 
d6 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
47 Id. at 34-35. 
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Breman's conclusion, regarding the framework he established for 
proving a section 2 case. However, with respect to the issue of intent, 
the Court was sharply divided. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the essence of 
a section 2 claim was that an election law, practice or structure, in 
conjunction with social and historical conditions, resulted in the 
diminution of the ability of minority voters to elect their preferred 
 candidate^.^^ However, the Court cautioned. that minority group 
members who challenge such systems must prove that the use of the 
challenged structure operates to minimize the ability of the group to 
elect their preferred  candidate^.^^ 
In order to prevail on a claim that the use of a multimember or at- 
large election system dilutes minority voting strength, the Court 
stated that the following circumstances must be found by the district 
court. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a single- 
member districtm Additionally, the minority group must be able to 
show that it is politically cohesive." Finally, the group must 
establish that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable 
it to defeat minority  candidate^.'^ By demonstrating the existence of 
Id at 47. 
49 GingZes, 478 U.S. 48. 
Id. at 50. Unless the minority group has the potential to elect representatives in 
the absence of the challenged structure, there can be no dilution. The single- 
member district is the appropriate standard against which to measure the potential 
of the minority group to elect candidates of its choice because it is the smallest 
political unit from which representatives are elected. Id n. 17. If the minority 
group is dispersed throughout an at-large district or county or is so numerically 
small that it could not constitute a majority in a single-member district, the group 
cannot maintain that they can elect representatives of their choice in the absence of 
the challenged structure because a smaller political sub-district or unit could not be 
created consistent with the Constitution'sone-person one-vote standard. 
" 478U.S.at 51. 
'* Id at 51. Prior to the 1982 amendments, in the context of a challenge to a 
multimember or at-large electoral structure, the courts held that in the absence of 
significant white bloc voting, it could not be contended that the ability of minority 
group members to elect their chosen representatives was inferior to white voters or 
that the at-large structure impeded the ability of minorities to win at the polls. See, 
e.g., McMillan V. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 73 1 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir.), appeal 
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these factors, the minority group can establish that submergence in a 
white multi-member district impedes its ability to elect its chosen 
representatives. 
After consideration of the Gingles preconditions, the lower court 
was required to examine the totality of the circumstances and 
determine, based upon "a searching practical evduation of the past 
and present political reality," whether the political processes were 
equally open to minority voters.53 The majority instructed that this 
determination requires an intensely local appraisal of the design and 
impact of the contested electoral systemn 
While the majority of the Court agreed with Justice Brennan's 
h e w o r k  for proving a section 2 case, they divided over the 
question of whether causation was relevant to the section 2 inquiry.s5 
Justice Brennan rejected any notion that intent proof had any role in a 
challenge under section 2. He believed that the language of section 2 
and the Senate Report made clear that the critical question in a 
section 2 claim was whether the use of a system or practice resulted 
in members of a minority group having less opportunity than whites 
to participate in the political proce~s .~  Justice Brennan opined that it 
was the difference betsveen the choices made by blacks and whites, 
not the reasons for that difference, that resulted in blacks having less 
opportunity than whites to elect their preferred candidates." 
Accordingly, in considering proof of racially polarized voting, 
Justice Brennan was concerned with the correlation betsveen the race 
of the voter and the selection of certain candidates, not the causes of 
the correlations8 
dism 'dand cert. denied, 469 U.S. 951 (1984); Nevitt v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209,223 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denid 446 U.S. 951 (1980). 
" Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45. 
"Id. at 79. 
" Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed with the opinion of Justice 
Breman that intent was irrelevant in a section 2 claim. 478 U.S. at 33. Justice 
O'Comor's opinion regard'ig the role of intent in the section 2 inquj, was joined 
by Chief JusticeBurger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist Id 
56 Gingles, 478 U.S. 48 11.15. 
"Id.  at 63-64. 
58 Id. at 64. JusticeBrennan was concerned, at this point in the opinion, with how 
a plaintiffproved the third Gmgles precondition: Whether the white majority votes 
consistently as a bloc to enable it to defeat minority candidates. Thii issue is also 
termed legally significant racial bloc voting. The defendants in Gingles contended 
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Justice Brennan also rejected the notion that plaintiffs were 
required to prove that white voters voted against black candidates 
because of racial animosity. He believed that this argument must be 
rejected for the same reasons that Congress repudiated the intent test 
Mobile with respect to legislative bodies. The intent test was 
unnecessarily divisive and involved charges of racism on the part of 
individual officials or entire communities. Under the old intent test, 
a plaintiff was required to prove that some elected officials were 
racists. Under the new intent test, a plaintiff would have to prove that 
most of the white community was racist in order to obtain judicial 
relief. As Justice Brennan concluded, "D]t is difficult to imagine a 
more racially divisive req~irement.'~~ 
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the new intent test because, as the 
Senate Report concluded regarding the old intent test, it asked the 
wrong question. According to Justice Brennan, all that mattered 
under section 2 was voter behavior and not its ex~planations.~ He 
feared that requiring proof that racial considerations actually caused 
voter behavior would result - contrary to congressional intent - in 
cases where a black minority that hctionally has been totally 
excluded fiom the political process will be unable to establish a 
section 2 ~iolation.~' 
Justice 07Connor, while agreeing with the M e w o r k  established 
by the majority for proving a section 2 claim, disagreed with Justice 
Brennan's complete rejection of intent evidence.62 She stated that if 
"statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted 
- - - - -- 
that in establishing this issue a plaintiff should not be permitted to rely solely on 
bivariate statistical analyses that correlated the race of the voter and the level of 
voter support for certain candidates. Such statistical evidence, according to the 
defendants, could not establish that race was the primary determinant of voters' 
choices. Essentially, the defendants were arguing for a new intent test, where the 
motivation of voters would have to be taken into account before racially polarized 
voting could be established. They argued for use of a multivariate approach that 
would take into consideration a variety of issues, such as party affiliation, age, 
religion, income, incumbency, education, and campaign expenditures. 478 U.S. 61- 
62. Justice Brennan completelyrejected this methodology, and concluded that "the 
legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent." 
Id. 
59 Id. at 72. 
60 Id. 
61 GingIes, 478 U.S. at 73. 
62 Id. at 84 (07Conner, J., concurring in judgment). 
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solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and 
to assess its prospects for electoral success . . . [a] defendan[t] can not 
rebut such proof by showing that the divergent racial voting patterns 
can be explained, in part, by causes other than race.'" 
However, Justice O'Connor refused to banish intent evidence from 
the overall vote dilution inquiry. She contended that evidence that a 
candidate preferred by minority voters \vas rejected by white voters 
for reasons other than those that made the candidate the preferred 
choice of minority voters may be relevant in determining whether 
white voters will vote consistently to defeat minority candidatesP1 
According to her analysis, such proof would suggest that another 
equally preferred minority candidates might be able to attract greater 
white support in the 
Justice O'Connor also believed that Congress intended that 
explanations for white voter behavior should be considered by the 
courts in the responsiveness c o ~ t e x t ~  She opined that in 
communities riven by racial hostility, such considerations would 
make it more likely that officials elected without significant minority 
support would consider minority group  interest^.^' Justice Oronnor 
concluded that in deciding a vote dilution claim al l  evidence 
concerning voting preferences should not be ~onsidered.~ 
While the opinions of Justices 0 'Connor and Brennan with respect 
to the issue of intent appear to be irreconcilable, there are some 
points where they converge. Justice O'Connor agreed that Congress 
rejected the intent test of Mobile.'j9 She agreed that the results test 
was chosen by Congress as the standard for a section 2 violation. 
Justice O'Connor also recognized that a plaintiff could choose to 
establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of 
discriminatory purpose?O However, unlike Justice Breman, she was 
unwilling to banish completely intent evidence fiom the vote dilution 
inquiry. She believed that such evidence could be helpfid to the 
" Id. at 100, 
Id. 
Id. 
66 GingIes, 478 U.S. at 100-01. 
67 Id. 
Id. 
69 Id. at 98. 
'O Id. at 99. 
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lower courts in determining whether the political processes were 
equally accessible to all players?' Accordingly, while declining to 
establish intent as an element of a plaintirs case in chief, she was 
willing to allow such evidence into the record for the courts to 
consider in determining the ultimate question." 
The problem with permitting the defendants to offer nonracial 
explanations for divergent voting patterns is that ultimately the 
burden of disproving these rationales falls back onto the shoulders of 
the plaintiffs. HOW is a plaintiff to rebut a showing that white voters 
are not racists because they have, occasionally, supported a "safe" 
black candidate who has been slated by the majority party? Will a 
plaintiff be called upon to commission a political survey of voters or 
a poll to assess the racial views of current voters? What about cases 
where the elections were held ten or twenty years ago? How is the 
plaintiff to meet the evidence that some white voters were not 
motivated by racial considerations? These thorny issues led Congress 
to reject intent evidence as posing an insurmountable burden on 
plaintiffs and requiring entire communities to be branded as racists. 
Congress and Justice Brennan got it right; requiring intent as an 
element of a section 2 claim is fiaught with difficulty. While 
understanding Justice O'Connor's reluctance to ban causation 
evidence from the totality of the circumstance test, by permitting 
defendants to raise the intent shield, cases where minorities have 
been shut out of the political process may go unremedied. It was that 
very evil that led Congress to reject the intent test. 
IV. TIHE IgEELMERGENCE OF THE INTENT TE$T. 
Following the decision in Gingles the circuit couuts have struggled 
to navigate between Justice Brennan7s view that intent had no role in 
the determination of a section 2 case and Justice O'Connor's view 
that it could be relevant to the overall inquiry under the totality of the 
circumstances. The courts that have considered this question have 
essentially adopted Justice 07Connor's position and have concluded 
that plaintiffs must prove intent, although it can be demonstrated 
inferentially. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 100. 
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A. League of United Latin Americwt Citizens v. Ckments 
(zULA9* 
In L m C ,  the Fifth Circuit explored the question of whether 
intent proof was required in a section 2 challenge to the at-large 
election of state supreme court judges?" The di&ct court held that 
in proving the third Gingles precondition (legally significant racial 
bloc voting) plaintiffs need only demonstrate that white and black 
voters generally supported different ~andidates.7~ Accordingly, the 
district court excluded evidence that tended to show that the 
divergent voting patters were attributable to factors other than race.76 
On appeal, the defendants contendedthat the district court committed 
error by refusing to consider the nonracial causes for voter 
preferencesn 
The Fifth Circuit en banc noted that the scope of the Voting Rights 
Act was broad, but concluded that section 2's protections extended 
only to defeats experienced by voters "on account of race or color.'"7a 
The court stated that "without an inquiry into the circumstances 
underlying unfavorable election returns," the lower courts would not 
be in a position to determine whether the losses experienced by 
minority voters were mere losses at the polls or the result of 
discrimi~ation.~~ According to the LULAC court, the inquhy into the 
* 999 F.2d 83 1 (5th Cir. 1993)(en banc). 
74 1d. at 837-3s. 
75 Id. at 837. 
"Id at 850. 
Id. at 842. 
78 Id at 850. The Senate Report discussed the use of the tern "on account of 
color", and concluded as follows: 
During the committee deliberations, opponents of the results test argued that 
the reported bill is inconsistent with the results standard bemuse section 2, 
as amended, still contains the phrase 'a denial or abridgement (of the right 
to vote) on account of race or color.' The argument is that the vrords 'on 
account of themselves create a requirement of purposeful 
discrimination.. . . Congress has used the words 'on account of race or 
color' in the act to mean 'with respect to' race or color, and not to connote 
any required purpose of racial discrimination. Any other arguments b a d  
on similar parsing of isolated words in the bill that there is some implied 
'purpose' component in section2 . . , are equally misplacedand incorrect 
S. Rep., supra note 20, at 192, n. 109. 
79 LUZAC, 999 F.2d at 850. 
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reasons for, or causes of, electoral losses must be undertaken in order 
to determine whether they were the product of partisan politics or 
racial vote dilution.* 
The LULAC court discussed the conflict between Justice Brennan 
and Justice O'Connor on this issue.s1 According to the Fifth Circuit 
five justices rejected Justice Brennan's approach, and, therefore, the 
opinions by Justices O'Connor and Justice White represented a 
majority of the Court and should be adhered to and not Justice 
Brennan's opinion on the issue of intent.82 Relying primarily on 
Justice O'Connor's opinion, the LULAC court decided that evidence 
seeking to explain the divergence of voting patterns between blacks 
and whites could not be excluded from the overall vote dilution 
inquiry.83 
While it adopted Justice O'Connor's approach, the Fifth Circuit 
did not hold that plaintiffs must supply conclusive proof that a 
minority group's failure to elect representatives of its choice is 
caused by racial animus in the white ele~torate.~ The court believed 
that such a requirement could be inferred from the text of the 
amended section 2, the case law pre-Mobile, and the Senate Report." 
In this regard, the court considered whether the plaintiffs had to 
prove affirmatively the existence of racial bias among the white 
electorate or merely negate the defendants' proof that partisan 
politics best explained the divergent voting  pattern^.'^ The court 
noted that requiring plaintiffs to establish that white voters were 
motivated by racial animus when they rejected minority preferred 
candidates would make the racial bloc voting inquiry difficult and 
expensive to establi~h.~ The court held that whether or not the 
*Id. at 853. 
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83. Justice White also disagreed with Justice 
Brennan's views on this issue and filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice White 
was of the opinion that where partisan affiliation and not race explained the 
divergence in voting patterns, a violation of section 2 may not be established. Id 
82 LUUC, 999 F.2d. at 855. 
83 Id. at 856. 
Id. at 859. 
8S Id. 
86 Id. 
Id. at 860. 
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burden of the plaintiffto prove racial bloc voting includes the burden 
to explain partisan influence, the result is the 
The LULAC court did not require plaintiffs to prove intent, in their 
case in chief, but following Justice O7Connor's approach, refused to 
banish fiom the racial bloc voting inquiry defendants' proof 
concerning partisanship. Essentially, the court adopted the view that 
the determination of a section 2 challenge must rest on a searching 
and thorough inquiry into the underlying circumstances of the 
election results offered by plaintiffs to demonstrate racial bloc voting 
and the causes of the divergence in voting patterns between white 
and black voters. While acknowledging that the additional inquiry 
required could be burdensome and costly, the court declined to 
follow the approach of the district court and exclude such evidence. 
Without giving guidance to the lower courts as to how a plaintiff 
rebuts the partisanship evidence, the LULAC court unsettled 
Congress' effort to c o w  the results standard. Despite Congress' 
best efforts to elucidate the meaning of the amendments to section 2, 
the Fifth Circuit adhered to the view that the words "on account of 
race or color" meant that, despite the Senate Report's rejection of the 
intent test, plaintiffs had to prove some form of purposell 
d i s ~ t i o n .  
B. Nipper v. Smithw 
In Nipper, Afiican-Americanvoters and an association of African- 
American attorneys challenged the at-large election of state court 
judges in Floridago One of the issues confronted by the Eleventh 
Circuit was whether plaintiffs, in order to prevail on their section 2 
claim, had to prove the existence of racial animus among the white 
electorate?' Unlike the court in LULAC, the Nipper court 
aflirmatively concluded that under the amended section 2, plaintiffs 
had to prove purposeful di~crimination.~ The Eleventh Circuit also 
gave guidance to the lower courts as to how a plaintiff meets that 
burden. After a review of the legislative history and pre-Mobile 
Id at 860. 
S9 39 F3d 1494 (1 lth Cir.1994) (en banc). 
go Id. at 1496-97. 
'' Id. at 1520. 
'* ~ d .  at 1515. 
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precedents, the court ruled that racial animus could be established 
infer en ti all^.^^ 
With respect to the threshold question, the Nipper court held that 
section 2 prohibits voting practices that have the effect of allowing a 
community motivated by racial prejudice to exclude a minority 
group from participation in the political process." Accordingly, if, 
under the totality of circumstances, there is insufficient evidence of 
racial bias operating in the community then a claim of vote dilution 
can not be established." 
The circuit court rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 2 
required only proof of disparate election results. The court relied on 
the language in the statute that limited its reach to cases where the 
deprivation of the franchise was "on account of race or color.'*' 
According to the court, Congress intended, by the use of that 
language, to retain racial bias as the gravamen of a vote dilution 
claim.97 Thus, some form of racial discrimination must be 
established in order to afford plaintiffs judicial relief? 
According to the court, the legislative history of the amended 
section 2 supported the conclusion that racial bias was the 
cornerstone of a vote dilution claim.99 The court observed that the 
intent of Congress in amending section 2 was to restore the "results" 
test of White and ~ i t c ~ r n b . ' ~ ~  Under those cases, a plaintiff had to 
establish proof of invidious discrimination as an essential element of 
a Fourteenth Amendment voting rights claim.'O1 A plaintiff could 
establish that element by either proving that legislative oficials 
intended to enact or maintain a discriminatory voting system or by 
proving the existence of objective factors (so-called Zimmer factors, 
subsequently incorporated in the amended statute as Senate factors) 
indicating that the minority group had less opportunity to participate 
93 Id. at 1526. 
94 Id. at 1534. 
95 Nipper, 39 F3d at 1514. 
96 Id. at 1515. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
Id. 
loo Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1517 (noting Congress' "stated purpose to return the 
Section 2 burden of proof to preBolden standards"). 
lo' Id. at 15 19. 
Heinonline - -  16 Touro L. Rev. 964 1999-2000 
VOrnG RlGHTS ACT 
in the political process and to elect candidates of its choice.'e2 The 
Supreme Court in Mobile eliminated the latter approach and required 
proof of discriminatory intent,lo3 
The Nipper court concluded that Congress' intent was to overturn 
the Mobile intent standard and restore the m i t e  method of proving 
vote dilution. According to the court, Congress kitended to eliminate 
solely the requirement that racial bias on the part of legislators or 
other officials was an essential ingredient of a vote dilution ~ l a i m . ' ~  
Their intent was not to banish consideration of racial bias from the 
inquiry. Thus, under the amended section 2, a plaintiff could choose 
to either establish discriminatory motive of the legislators or 
demonstrate, through proof of the Senate factors, that the electoral 
system interacts with racial bias in the community and allows that 
bias to dilute minority voting strength. 
In reaching the conclusion that intent was an essential element of a 
plaintiffs case under section 2, the court rejected the Department of 
Justice's position, as amicus curiae, that section 2 required no proof 
whatsoever of intentional di~crimination.'~ In support of its position, 
the Department of Justice relied on the Judiciary Committee's Report 
wherein it was stated that ''the specific intent of [the] amendment is 
that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results 
without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose."lM The court 
stated that statements in the Report about avoiding the intent standard 
must be considered in light of the goal of Congress to overturn the 
Mobile legislative intent requirement.107 According to the court, "the 
many references to intent, motivation and purpose throughout the 
Report. . . must be read to infer to the intent of those responsible for 
erecting or maintaining the challenged scheme."'" The court 
concluded that the legislative history did not reveal any intent on the 
'02 Id. 
lo3 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,66 (1980) (finding that "a plaintiff must prove 
that the disputed plan was conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to 
fbrther racial. . . discrimination"). 
lM Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1520. 
las Id. 
lo6 S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 28, emphasis supplied. 
lo7 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1520. 
lo' Id. at 1522. 
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part of Congress to limit section 2 inquiry to a purely statistical test, 
without any considerationof racial bias.lW 
Having concluded that racial bias remained an essential element of 
a plaintifl's challenge to electoral practices under section 2, the court 
focussed on operationalizing its decision. The court opined that 
"proof of the second and third GingIes preconditions [minority 
political cohesion and white bloc voting against minority preferred 
candidates] is circumstantial evidence of racial bias operating 
through the electoral system to deny minority voters equal access to 
the political process."110 Accordingly, the court held that the 
existence of those factors, and a feasible remedy, generally would be 
sufficient to warrantjudicial relief."' 
The defendant can rebut a plaintifE's [circumstantial showing of 
discriminatory motive], by demonstrating the absence of racial bias 
in the voting ~ommunity."~ One approach available to a defendant 
would be to demonstrate that the divergent voting patterns could best 
be explained by other, non-racial circum~tances."~ If the defendant 
offers such proof, the district court must make a searching inquiry 
into the past and present reality, under the totality of circumstances 
test, to determine whether minority voters have been denied equal 
access to the political process on account of race or c01or."~ The 
court stated that under this burden shifting approach, plaintiffs were 
not required to proof a negative. Instead, plaintiffs could establish 
that racial bias was operating in the community by demonstrating 
through a statistical analysis that there were divergent voting patterns 
among white and black voters.115 
Finally, the court observed that vote dilution cases were 
circumstantial evidence cases.l16 It acknowledged that rarely will 
there be direct proof that resolves the contested issues. Rather, 
Congress intended, and GingIes confirmed, that the objective factors 
listed in the Report would be used by districts courts in making a 
log Id. at 1 52 1-23. 
"O Id. at 1524. 
'I1 Id. 
' I 2  Id. 
113 Id. 
' l4 Id. 
'Is Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1525. 
'I6  Id. 
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particularized determination as to whether, in the aggregate, there 
was sufficient evidence pointing to dilution."' Therefore, when 
confronted with a defendant's rebuttal evidence, the district court 
must search the record to determine under the totality test whether 
the challenged system has operated to deny minority voters an equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process.1r8 
The Nipper court was the first circuit court to resurrect the intent 
test fiom the ashes. Despite Congress' best efforts to consign the 
intent test to the dustbin of history, the Eleventh Circuit chose to 
parse the language of the Report to support its conclusion that some 
form of intent was still required. However, a thorough review of the 
Report belies that approach. Nowhere in the Report is there any 
support for the subtle distinctions that the Eleventh Circuit found 
regarding intent of legislators as opposed to the intent of the voters. 
Essentially, the court acknowledged that intent of the legislators was 
not required, but opined that intent of the voters was required to be 
established by a plaintiff to make out a violation of the amended 
section 2.119 While one can understand the desire to harmonize the 
amended statute with the pre-Mobile decisions in Nhite and 
Whitcomb, there is little support for the proposition that Congress 
intended to eliminate only part of the intent test. As Justice B r e ~ a n  
noted in Gingles, this new and improved intent test \as as pernicious 
as the old Mobile test. 
This conclusion is supported by the Nipper court's assignment to 
the plaintiff the burden of rebutting a defendant's non-racial 
explanations for divergent voting patterns. While the court permitted 
the intent element to be demonstrated inferentially through statistical 
proof, the court gave no guidance as to how a plaintiffrebuts direct 
evidence of a defendant that racial bias was not operating in the 
community. Clearly, once such rebuttal evidence is received a 
plaintiffcan not rely on the intent inference, but must go beyond the 
statistical proof and, presumably, offer direct evidence of racial bias 
or undercut the defendant's evidence by attacking the credibility of 
the witnesses or the methodology of defense experts. This inquiry 
unduly complicates a section 2 case and gives almost no guidance to 
the district courts as to how they are to weigh and balance these 
l7 Id. 
118 Id. at 1526. 
l9 ~ d .  
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competing inferences. The concern is that a defendant may escape a 
liability finding by offering "non-racial" explanations that mask 
racial considerations; thereby blunting the efficacy of section 2. 
C. Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of HoIy~ke~~O 
In Uno, the First Circuit addressed the issue of what role, if any, 
intent evidence played in the vote dilution inquiry under section 2.12' 
Essentially, the First Circuit followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit 
and held that such proof was relevant to a challenge to an at-large 
election scheme.'" The Uno court also cautioned that permitting 
such an inquiry raised concerns that defendants could escape a 
liability finding by offering "non-racial" rationales for divergent 
voting patterns. 
The court began its discussion of section 2 by noting that the 
Gingles preconditions were the foundation for a vote dilution 
Plaintiffs have to show that the minority group is 
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single- 
member district. Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the 
minority group is politically cohesive, and that there is significant 
bloc voting by non-minorities against the community's preferred 
candidates. According to the court, "proof of all three preconditions 
creates an iderence that members of the minority [group have been] 
harmed" by the challenged structure or procedure.12' The court 
cautioned that the vote dilution inference is not irrebuttable. The 
inference of vote dilution can be rebutted by other evidence. 
Accordingly, the court instructed that a district court should be 
careful not to "wear blinders."125 The trial court must "sift the 
evidence produced at trial and gather enough information to paint a 
picture of the attendant facts and circurn~tances."'~~ After all the 
evidence is received, the trial court must feel the political fabric for 
texture and nuance, in order to determine whether the minority group 
120 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995). 
12' Id. at 977. 
'" Id. at981. 
Id. at 979-80. 
124 Id. at 980. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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has been denied equal access to the political process. In this regard, 
the Uno court concluded that completing the inquiry demands 
comprehensive,not limited, canvassing of the pertinent facts.'n 
After establishing the fkimework for a challenge to an at-large 
system under section 2, the Uno court grappled with the controversy 
concerning the intent question. The court acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court in Gingles split on this question and that the 
controversy has raged since then in the circuit courts.128 The court 
considered this an issue of relevance. "The court believed that the 
presence or absence of bias is arguably relevant to the question of 
whether a minority group lacks equal" electoral access.1w The court 
observed that in a community divided along racial lines, the 
prospects for electoral success differed markedly from its prospects 
in a more cohesive ~0mmunity.l~~ Additionally, sentiments unrelated 
to race could also affect election results. The court concluded that 
when it can be demonstrated that voters in a particular community 
are motivated primarily by non-racial causes, it was reasonable to 
assume that a minority-preferred candidate who embodied these 
values might equally be able to engender support among a majority 
of the white voters.'31 
"The Uno court concluded that when racial antagonism is not the 
cause of an electoral defeat suffered by a [minority-preferred] 
candidate, the defeat does not prove a lack of electoral opportunity" 
that section 2 was designed to remedy.'3t Such political defeats may 
be attributable to the candidate's failure to support popular 
programmative initiatives, or the candidate's failure to reflect the 
majority's ideological viewpoints (partisanship), or the popularity of 
an Where such considerations caused the defeat of a 
minority candidate, section 2 does not provide relief. Follo~ving this 
analysis to its logical conclusion, the court held that plaintiffs cannot 
prevail on a section 2 claim, if there is significantly probative 
ln Uno, 72 F3d at 979-80. 
lZ8 Id. at 980 (citing Nippe, and LULAC). 
lZ9 Id. at 981. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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evidence that whites voted as a bloc for reasons wholly unrelated to 
racial animus.lw 
The First Circuit argued that its conclusion drew support fiom the 
legislative history of the amended section 2. Without any 
independent review of the Senate Report or other documents 
illustrative of congressional intent, the court concluded that the use 
of the words "on account of race or color" meant that intent was still 
an issue.13' Without quoting a single sentence fiom the Senate 
Report or the legislative debates, the court determined that when 
Congress discardedthe intent test, it meant only to eliminate from the 
microscope evidence regarding the intent of the legislators in 
enacting or maintaining the challenged system.'36 
In reaching this conclusion the Court ignored the clear 
pronouncement in the Senate Report that under the amended section 
2 a plaintiff did not have to prove intent of any kind.In Moreover, a 
thorough review of that report fails to disclose any intention of 
Congress that some form of the intent standard was alive and well 
after the amendment. Additionally, the words "on account of race or 
color7' were not intended to require proof of a causation factor, and 
the Judiciary Committee so stated.'38 Congress could not have been 
more clear when it rejected the intent standard.'39 Despite Congress' 
valiant attempt to correct the Supreme Court's misreading of the 
original section 2, the Uno court, like the LULAC 'and Nipper courts 
refbsed to adhere to congressional intent. 
Despite raising the bar for a voting rights plaintiff, the Uno court 
acknowledged that permitting inquiry into the causes of white bloc 
- -- - -- - - - - 
Uno, 72 F.3d at 981. 
13' Id. at 982-83. 
13' Id. at 982. 
13' S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 13 ("In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose 
should not be a prerequisite to establishinga violation of section 2.); Id. at 22 ("The 
specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish 
discriminatoryresults without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose."). 
1 3 ~  S. Rep., supra n.20, at 192, 11.109. ("[Ilt is patently clear that Congress has 
used the words 'on account of race or color' in the Act to mean 'with respect to' 
race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination. 
Any. . . arguments . . . that there is some implied 'purpose' component in section 2, 
even when plaintiffs proceed under the results standard, are equally misplaced and 
incorrect.'). 
13'See supra, note 40. 
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voting could jeopardize the effectiveness of section 2.1j0 In response, 
the First Circuit complained that skeptics misunderstood the nature 
of the showing needed to support a section 2 According to 
the Court, proof of the second and third Gingles preconditions 
(minority political cohesion and white bloc voting) demonstrates that 
racial cleavages in voting patterns existed, and that these differences 
"were deep enough to defeat minority preferred candidates time and 
Proof of these two preconditions, gives rise to a strong 
"inference that racial bias is operating through the medium [of the 
challengedstructure] to impair minority political [~uccess]."~~' 
The dilution inference remains unless the defendant adduces 
evidence tending to prove that the divergent voting patterns can most 
logically be explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of 
race with the challenged structure or practice. Such factors could 
include organizational disarray, lack of funds, want of campaign 
experience, the unattractiveness of particular candidates, or the 
universal popularity of an opponent.lU However, the court cautioned 
that even when such proof is forthcoming the defendant does not 
automatically triumph. Before rejecting a section 2 challenge, "the 
court must determine whether, [under] the totality of circumstances 
test (including the original dilution inference and its factual 
predicate), the minority group was denied meaningll access to the 
political process on account of race [or col~r]."''~ 
The court stated that this framework imposed a "high hurdle" for 
defendants who seek to defend against statistical evidence of 
divergent voting patterns.la The court emphasized that plaintiffs are 
not required to disprove every possible explanation for racially 
polarized voting in order to establish vote dilutio~'~' Plaintiffs have 
to demonstrate that the three preconditions (alone or in combination 
with the totality of circumstances) are strong enough thaf 
notwithstanding the countervailing evidence of other causative 
'40 Uno, 72 F.3d at 982. 
141 Id. 
142 
143 Id. 
la Uno, 72 F.3d at 983. n. 4. 
14' Id. at 983. 
la Id. 
14' Id. 
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factors offered by the defendants, the record sustains a claim that 
racial politics have resulted in diminished electoral opportunities for 
minority ~ 0 t e r s . l ~ ~  
The First Circuit held plaintiffs to a strict standard and gave 
comfort to the defendants seeking to defend at-large elections. By 
allowing a multifactored, multivariable analysis, the Court 
introduced uncertainty into the voting rights field and beclouded the 
vitality of section 2. Under this new and improved intent test, faced 
with statistical showings of divergent voting patterns, defendants can 
offer a host of expert opinions as to why the voting patterns were so 
segregated. A defendant will argue that white voters rejected a 
particular candidate because he did not share their concerns about 
increasing crime or taxes. Some defendants will argue that the 
candidate was not well known, had a poor campaign or lacked 
money and that these factors resulted in her defeat. This velcro 
approach to litigation belittles the serious threat to democracy that 
disenfianchisementrepresents. As the Uno court recognized, "In this 
enlightened day and age, bigots rarely advertise an intention to 
engage in race-conscious politics."149 The concerns is that by 
allowing defendants to posit any number of explanations for 
divergent voting patterns, election systems that have shut out 
minority voters will go unremedied because a district chose to credit 
a defendant's explanations over a plaintiffs statistical showing. 
Without guiding the district court's assessment of the evidence, the 
Uno court's burden allocation jeopardizes the goals of the Voting 
Rights Act.lSO 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 984 (noting that "[nlot surprisingly . . . racially polarized voting tends to 
be a silent, shadowy thief of the minority's rights"). 
lS0 In the Senate Report the Judiciary Committee reviewed the purpose of the Act: 
Seventeen years ago, Americans of all races and creeds joined to persuade 
the nation to confront its conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the 
constitution. From that effort came the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
President Lyndon Johnson hailed its enactments as a 'triumph for fieedom 
as huge as any ever won by any battlefield.' The Act has attacked the 
shameful blight of voting discrimination. 
S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 4. 
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D. GOOSBY K TOJW BOARD OF THE TOWN OF 
HEMPSrn'=l 
In Goosby, the Second Circuit confronted the issues addressed in 
Nipper and Uno, i.e. whether intent was an element to be considered 
in a section 2 case.lS2 In this case, the defendants contended that 
partisanship politics best explained the divergent voting patterns in 
the Town of Hempstead's Town Board ele~tions.''~ They urged that 
the statistical proof demonstrating the correlation between partisan 
affiliation of the voters and the votes cast for particular candidates 
precluded a hding of legally significant racial bloc voting (third 
Gingles precondition).lS The district court rejected that approach 
and instead weighed defendants proof at the totality stage."$ The 
circuit court agreed with the district judge's methodology and 
d ikned his conclusion that partisanship did not best explain the 
divergence in the vote.lS6 Judge Pierre Leval concurred in the result 
and wrote separately to express his views regarding the role of intent 
evidence in a section 2 case.'" 
In Goosby, the defendants argued that the divergent voting patterns 
evident in the Town elections resulted fiom the political choice of the 
vast majority of white voters to register in and vote for the 
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - 
lS1 180 F3d 476 (2nd. Cir. 1999). 
lS2 Id. at 482. 
153 Id. (arguing that "Republican Party affiliation was determinant of electoral 
success in Town-wide elections, the voting block that plaintiff had demonstrated 
- 
was along partisan, not racial, lies"). 
154 Id. 
lSs In rejecting the defendant's argument the district court stated. 
In evaluating all of the relevant facts as a whole, including the size of the 
Towvn, the absence of geographic sub-districts, the lack of access by blacks 
to the Republican Party slating process, the unfortunateuse of racial appeals 
in politicalcampaigns, the lack of responsiveness by the Town Board to the 
particularizedneeds of the black communities, and the stated desin by the 
Town government to c l i g  to a monolithic, single-voice legislature for a 
heterogeneous population consisting of many different communities and 
voices, I conclude that black citizens' failure to elect representativesof their 
choice to the Town Board is not best explained by partisan politics. 
Goosby, 956 F. Supp. 326,355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
lS6 Id. at 493. 
lS7 Goosby, 180 F.3d at 498 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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Republican Party and its candidates.Is8 According to the defendants, 
white bloc voting patterns cannot be legally significant under the 
third Gingles precondition unless the plaintiffs prove that the 
differences are attributable to racial  consideration^.'^^ Under this 
view of section 2, the district courts should not consider the totality 
of circumstances unless and until plaintiffs have proven racial 
animus at the precondition stage. 
The Second Circuit rejected the defendants approach. The court 
concluded that an inquiry into the causes of white bloc voting is not 
relevant at the Gingles precondition stage.I6O Such evidence was 
relevant, however, in the totality of circumstances inquiry.I6' 
Accordingly, the court ratified the approach of the district court when 
it considered and rejected defendant's evidence at the totality stage of 
the analysis. la 
Judge Leval voted to &inn the judgment of the district court, "but 
for slightly different reasons."163 He began his analysis with a 
critique of section 2 and the lack of clarity in the amended statute.'64 
Judge Leval described the amended section 2 as a "compromise that 
seeks to have things both ways."'65 He stated that "interpreting such 
a statute poses a particular challenge" for the judiciary.'& One 
approach to statutory interpretation, he stated, suggests that judges 
should rely on "the text and a dictionary."16' Judge Leval opined that 
such an approach is useful where the statute provides clear and 
definitive instructions, but of little utility when the statute contains no 
such guidance.168 
Another approach to statutory construction involves a more activist 
approach to judicial interpretation. Judge Leval wrote that where 
lS8 Id. at 484. 
Id. at 482. 
160 Id. at 493. 
la' Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 498 (Leval, J., concurring). 
Goosby, 180 F.3d at 500 (noting that "[olne has almost no guidance as to 
what illegally lessens the opportunity to vote"). 
Id. at 501 (citing Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 
359 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Id. 
16' Id. 
Goosby, 180 F.3d at 501. 
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"Congress was internally divided or lacked a clear idea as to how a 
general principle should play out in specific [settings], a special 
relationship . . . between Congress and the courts [arises]."169 
According to Judge Leval, where, as here, the major questions are 
unanswered, Congress enters into a partnership with the courts.'7" 
Under this method, the courts have the task of interstitial gap-filling. 
According to Judge Leval, in Waling this task, the courts are 
assigned the task of providing answers to the unanswered questions 
based on "common sense and good judgment.""' The goal of the 
court should be to "giv[e] effect to the incompletely formulated 
intentions and compromises of the statute."'" In his opinion, in the 
Voting Rights Act Congress has assigned the courts such a 
partnership role.ln 
On the issue of intent and its role in the amended section 2, Judge 
Leval opined that Congress' intent was stated imperfectly. The 
amendment made clear that the statute no longer required 
discriminatory intent by a state actor, but was unclear as to whether 
intent was banished fiom con side ratio^'^^ In his view, retention of 
the words "on account of race or color" suggests a concern for race- 
based motivation, at least within the electorate.lX Judge Leval also 
found a lack of clarity with respect to section 2's requirement that a 
plaintiff demonstrate that a minority group has less opportunity to 
participate in the political process.'7b He believed that some 
violations of the statute might require race-based intent on the part of 
officials or voters and others would not require racial animus.ln 
After analyzing the statute and its legislative history, Judge Leval 
turnedto the precedent under the amended section 2 for guidance on 
the intent question; he found little help. He noted that the Supreme 
Court has offered no definitive guidance on the issue of intent in 
lag Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
'" Goosby, 180 F.3d at 501. 
In Id. 
174 Id. at 499. 
175 Goosby, 180 F.3d at 499. Judge Leval acknowledged that construed similar 
language did not require proof of race-based intent. See, ag., Grigg v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). 
'"Id. at 500. 
In Id. at 501. 
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GingIes or s~bsequently.'~~ In Gingles, four justices understood 
section 2 as requiring no evidence of racial intent, and five justices 
expressed different views.179 
Judge Leval considered and addressed Justice Brennan's concerns 
regarding intent. Justice Brennan, relying on the Senate Report, 
rejected the intent test because it could be divisive and would be 
difficult to prove.'* In Judge Leval's opinion, these considerations 
should not preclude requiring intent evidence."' He stated that "the 
difficulty proving racial animus, in some circumstances, may result 
from the fact that there was none."Is2 He feared that the invalidation 
of election procedures in the absence of racial motivation could 
produce enormous disruptions in the political process; a result he 
believed Congress did not intend.la 
In his view, "the more deeply judicial intervention intrudes into the 
political process, the more reluctant courts should be to find a 
violation without a finding of racial moti~ation."'~ He believed that, 
in determining the nature of the intent showing required to 
demonstrate a violation of section 2, the court should consider 
whether the complaint alleges a violation of process or outcome.'8s 
In the former, the law may guarantee a fair process whether or not 
the unfairness is the product of discriminatory intent. However, 
where the complaint alleges that a minority group has been unable to 
elect representatives of their choice, the plaintiffs are complaining 
about outcomes. In this species of vote dilution claims, it is 
reasonable to require as a predicate for judicial relief that 
"discrimination, within the electorate if not the state, has infected the 
election"'86 When discrimination is present, it can be said that the 
process [was also unfair in that it was tainted by an'J illegitimate 
animus.'87 Accordingly, where the complaint alleges only bad 
Id. at 500. 
179 Id. 
Gingles, 486 U.S. at 71-73. 
18' Goosby, 180 F.3d at 50 1. 
IS2 Id. 
la Id. at 501-02. 
Id. 
Id. at 502. 
Id. at 502, n.4. 
Id.at 502. 
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outcomes, a requirement of intentional discrimination would be 
reas0nab1e.l~~ 
Judge Leval believed such a requirement was appropriate where 
the complaint alleges that voters of the protected class have had little 
success in electing candidates of their choice. In such a case, the 
remedy for the violation "would require a radical political 
restructuring - either by redrawing district lines or by changing the 
nature of representation fiom at-large to single representative 
districts."1s9 Where the courts are required to intrude to such an 
extent in the political process, Judge Leval contended that more than 
defeat at the polls was requiredIP0 Some showing of intentional 
discrimination was an essential element. 
Having established that intent proof was required in a challenge to 
an at-large election system, Judge Leval proceeded to create a 
framework for receiving evidence. He concluded that a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie violation by proving the three Gingks 
preconditions.lgl Proof of these three factors supports an inference 
that race may have been a motivating factor to justify imposing in the 
defendant the burden to prove that the consistent defeat of minority 
preferred candidates was not the result of race- based intent on the 
part of the governing officials or the ele~torate.'~ 
Applying his model to the facts of the case, Judge Leval voted to 
affirm. He concluded that the district court properly found that the 
three preconditions were satisfied, and that the burden shifted to the 
defendants to prove that race was not a motivating factor.Ig3 Based 
on the record, he determined that the defendants had not carried their 
burden of disproving race-based intent.Ig3 Accordingly, Judge Leval 
statedhis belief that the plaintiffs had proved a section 2 violation. 
Is8 Id. at 502, n. 4. 
IS9 Goosby, 180 F.3d at 502. 
lgO Id. at 502, nA. 
lgl Id. at 502. 
l" Id. at 502-03. 
Id. at 503. 
Id. at 50. In support of his conclusion that the defendant had not disproved 
intent, Judge Leval relied on the following: 
Racial appeals have been features of Town elections on more than one 
occasion. To\n law enforcement officers have engaged in nce-conscious 
policing- - essentially telling black youths visiting fiom Queens to 'go back 
were they belong.' Agencies of the Town government have committed acts 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The opinions from LULAC to Goosby demonstrate the complexity 
of section 2 and the confusion engendered by its amendment in 1982. 
Admittedly, the statute was the product of intense pressure and 
compromise. The language and history of the amendment can be 
parsed to find that no intent is required and that some intent was 
required. There is support in the legislative history for the 
propositionthat Congress sought to banish intent as a prerequisite for 
a vote dilution claim. The Senate Report clearly stated that plaintiffs 
could prove a section 2 violation without showing motivation of any 
kind. Of course, the Report is silent as to whether a defendant can 
offer non-racial explanations to rebut a plaintiffs proof. 
Additionally, there is no indication in the legislative history that 
Congress, when it rejected the intent standard, intended to permit an 
inquiry into motivations of the electorate, while at the same time 
excluding from the inquiry the intent of legislators. While Congress 
may not have expressed its intention clearly in the words of the 
statute, when the Report is examined the relevance of intent evidence 
to the vote dilution inquiry is clear - such proof was not deemed 
relevant to the plaintiffs prima facie case. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, faced with the uncertainty 
regarding the intent question, the courts, as Judge Leva1 suggested, 
have played an interstitial role as they sought to give meaning to the 
words Congress used in the amended section 2. Regardless of 
whether Congress intended proof of intent on the part of legislators 
or the electorate to be considered in a section 2 case, the courts have 
concluded that such evidence should not be banished from the 
inquiry. 
The next question is who has the burden of proving intent of the 
electorate. When the various circuit court opinions are synthesized, a 
consistent approach emerges. No court has required that plaintiff 
establish through direct evidence that race-based considerations 
of racial discriminationto which the Town has made no response. And the 
Town has a history of indifference to the economic and social needs of the 
black communities within Hempstead, even though they have lower 
incomes than the rest of the Town. 
Id. 
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motivatedthe electorate or the legislature. If such proof is available, 
it should be received and evaluated. However, section 2 cases are by 
their very nature circumstantial and require a sifting of the evidence 
in order to give context and meaning to the nuances of proof. The 
circuit courts have consistently stated that when the Gingles 
preconditions are established, a rebuttable inference is created that 
race is operating in the challenged jurisdiction. Proof of the 
preconditions does not depend on the type of searching evaluation 
made at the totality stage. In the precondition state, the proof can be 
purely statistical without any anecdotal testimony. 
Once a plaintiff has established the preconditions, the burden of 
disproving motivation is placed on the defendants. They must come 
f o m d  with evidence tending to show that other factors motivated 
the choices made by the electorate, or, in the appropriate case, the 
legislature. Where such showing is made, the burden of production 
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that when viewed through 
the prism of the totality test, the minority group does not have an 
equal access to the political process and that racial consideration are 
at play in the jurisdiction. This requirement is met by offering proof 
of the Senate Report factors. A review of the evidence of these 
factors gives the district court a sense of the past and present realities 
in the community. Where race is a motivating factor, one would 
expect that proof of the Senate Report criteria will reveal that, 
contrary to the rationales offered by a defendant, race is playing a 
role in the society in which the challenged system is operating. 
Admittedly, this is a vague and amorphous standard. There are no 
clear-cut guides to assist a court in reaching the ultimate conclusion. 
The factors are intended to give context and meaning to the inquiry. 
In order to evaluate the evidence, the court must immerse itself in an 
intensely local appraisal of the political reality of the community. 
Essentially, the court is attempting to determine whether a radical 
restructuring of a political structure is ~van-anted. Given federalism 
concerns, such an intrusion into local politics should only be made 
by a federal court after evaluating all the evidence. This approach 
gives the court broad discretion to remedy vote dilution violation 
upon a review of all the evidence. 
There remains a concern that a clever defendant could offer 
pretextual rationales designed to mask racial considerations. Where 
such proof is offered, the question of how a plaintiff responds is 
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complex. First, a plaintiff can attack the credibility or methodology 
of the defense experts. Second, the plaintiff can, through anecdotal 
testimony, demonstrate that the rationales offered are pretexts for 
discrimination. Third, the plaintiff can overwhelm the record with 
proof that race matters in the challenged jurisdiction. Of course, at 
the end of the day, the determination of the proper balance depends 
as much on the judicial philosophy of the trial of Fact and the circuit 
court that reviews the trial court's findings and conclusion. This is 
frequently the case in situations where the test to be employed is a 
vague and ambiguous one. 
The Voting Rights Act has been a powerfbl engine for changing 
the face of democracy in the United States. Gone are the days of the 
literacy test and the poll tax. The Act has ushered in a new day in 
American politics where African-Americans can finally achieve 
some modicum of political success, unmarred by racism. Yet, the 
Act has been limited and restricted by the debate over intent. 
Perhaps, when the statute is again considered by Congress for 
extension, the intent question will finally be put to rest. Until then, 
litigators, on both sides of the equation, will have to struggle to give 
meaning and context to the words of the statute and the will of the 
courts. 
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